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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Osterhoudt appeals from his Judgment of Conviction Upon a Guilty Verdict to 
Four Felony Counts, and Order of Commitment. He asserts that the district court erred 
by allowing the alleged victim, H.O., to that Mr. Osterhoudt provided her with 
methamphetamine, and further erred by allowing H.O. to testify that Mr. Osterhoudt 
committed the act of oral to genital contact upon her when she was age five. 
Additionally, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that the district court erred by allowing the State to 
present the recordings of conversations between he and his niece and between he and 
his mother, as substantive evidence. Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that even if the State 
attempted to demonstrate that each of these three preserved errors is individually 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the accumulation of these errors deprived him of 
a fair trial. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's misguided attempt to change 
one of Mr. Osterhoudt's preserved claims - that the district court erred in admitting 
hearsay statements as substantive evidence - into a claim of unpreserved error, and to 
address the State's forfeiture of any argument that the preserved errors in the present 
case were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Osterhoudt's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief in 
detail, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by allowing the State to present evidence, pursuant to 
IRE 404(b), that Mr. Osterhoudt provided methamphetamine to H.O., as such 
evidence was not relevant to any charged count? 
2. Did the district court err by allowing the State to present evidence, in rebuttal and 
pursuant to IRE 404(b), that Mr. Osterhoudt molested H.O. when she was five 
years old, as such evidence did not rebut any arguments or claims made by the 
defense? 
3. Did the district court err by allowing recordings of phone conversations between 
Mr. Osterhoudt and his niece, and Mr. Osterhoudt and his mother, as substantive 
evidence for the truth of the matter asserted? 
4. Even if individually harmless, did the accumulation of preserved errors in this 





The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Evidence, Pursuant To IRE 
404(8), That Mr. Osterhoudt Provided Methamphetamine To H.O., As Such Evidence 
Was Not Relevant To Any Charged Count 
Over defense objection, the district court allowed the State to present evidence 
that Mr. Osterhoudt was "grooming" H.O. by providing her methamphetamine, beginning 
when she was 14 years old. The court ruled that such evidence was admissible only as 
it related to Count I, which alleged an act of lewd conduct committed on or between 
November 1, 2006, and November 30, 2006. As H.O. herself testified, she had stopped 
using methamphetamine by October of 2006. Therefore, because Mr. Osterhoudt's 
alleged providing meth to H.O. is not tied to any charged crime, such evidence was not 
relevant. As such, the district court erred in finding that the evidence was relevant and 
abused its discretion by admitting this evidence. Mr. Osterhoudt further asserts that the 
State will not be able to prove the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. His 
arguments on this issue are found in the Appellant's Brief and are not repeated herein. 
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.19-27.) 
The State's argument in response to this claim is simply that the district court did 
not err in its ruling, and is generally unremarkable. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12.) 
However, the State failed to make any assertion that, should this Court agree with 
Mr. Osterhoudt and find that the district court did err in admitting the evidence, the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See generally, Respondent's Brief.) As 
such, should this Court find that the district court erred in allowing the State to present 
evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt provided H.O. with methamphetamine, this Court must 
3 
vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court. See State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (holding that where alleged error is followed by a 
contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State 
bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based 
upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see a/so State v. Almaraz, 2013 Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1, 
2013) (petition for rehearing pending). 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Evidence, In Rebuttal And 
Pursuant To IRE 404(b), That Ms. Osterhoudt Molested H.O. When She Was Five 
Years Old, As Such Evidence Did Not Rebut Any Arguments Or Claims Made By The 
Defense 
Over the objection of defense counsel, the district court allowed H.O. to testify 
that she first claimed that Mr. Osterhoudt had sexually abused her when she was five 
years old, purportedly in rebuttal to the claim that she accused Mr. Osterhoudt so that 
she could be with her boyfriend, Mr. Pederson. However, this evidence did not actually 
rebut any evidence presented by the defense, and was pure propensity evidence. As 
such, the district court erred in finding that the evidence was relevant and abused its 
discretion by admitting this evidence. Mr. Osterhoudt further asserts that the State will 
be unable to prove that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. His 
arguments on this issue are found in the Appellant's Brief and are not repeated herein. 
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.27-33.) 
The State's argument in response to this claim is simply that the district court did 
not err in its ruling, and is generally unremarkable. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.12-14.) 
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However, the State failed to make any assertion that, should this Court agree with 
Mr. Osterhoudt and find that the district court did err in admitting the evidence, the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See generally, Respondent's Brief.) As 
such, should this Court find that the district court erred in allowing the State to present 
evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt molested H.O. when she was five years old, this Court 
must vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court. See State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (holding that where alleged error is followed by a 
contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State 
bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based 
upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also State v. Almaraz, 2013 Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1, 
2013) (petition for rehearing pending). 
111. 
The District Court Erred By Admitting Recordings Of Phone Conversations Between 
Mr. Osterhoudt And His Niece, And Mr. Osterhoudt And His Mother, As Substantive 
Evidence For The Truth Of The Matter Asserted 
Over defense objection, the district court allowed the State to present audio 
recordings of phone conversations that Mr. Osterhoudt had with his niece and his 
mother, as substantive evidence. Assuming the evidence was admissible as either 
impeachment evidence or evidence of bias on the part of either S.M. or Sharon 
Williams, the proffered evidence was still hearsay and should not have been admitted 
for the truth of the matter asserted. By allowing the jury to consider these recordings as 
substantive evidence, rather than merely impeaching, the district court abused its 
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discretion. Furthermore, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that the State will be unable to prove 
the error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In response, the State declines to address the actual issue raised by 
Mr. Osterhoudt and instead asserts that Mr. Osterhoudt is at fault because he failed to 
ask the court to instruct the jury that they could not consider the evidence for the truth of 
the matter asserted, thereby purportedly shifting the burden to Mr. Osterhoudt to 
demonstrate the error requires reversal under a Perry fundamental error analysis. 1 
(See Respondent's Brief pp.15-17.) Notably, the State does not actually argue or 
attempt to support with citations to the record that the district court ruled that the jury 
could not consider the evidence for truth of the matter asserted, apparently conceding 
that the district court admitted the recordings as substantive evidence. (See 
Respondent's Brief pp.15-17.) Had the State made such an assertion, the State would 
be impliedly conceding that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 
arguments by referring to the recordings as substantive evidence. (See 
Tr.Opening/Closing Arguments, p.98, L.19 - p.99, L.14. (State arguing "Those tapes 
clearly indicate collusion."); see also State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507 (1999) 
(finding misconduct where prosecutor argued an audio recording admitted solely for 
1 If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only be 
reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. Such review 
includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading 
the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether 
the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. If the defendant 
persuades the appellate court that the complained of error satisfies this three-prong 
inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and remand. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 229 (2010). 
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impeachment purposes was substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt). 2) 
Regardless, the record demonstrates that the recordings were admitted as substantive 
evidence, over the objection of defense counsel, and the State's argument that the error 
in this case is unpreserved is without merit. 
When discussing the State's motion to present the audio recordings as rebuttal 
evidence, the following exchange occurred: 
[Defense counsel, Mr. Essma:] There's a huge objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: How is it improper rebuttal? 
MR. ESSMA: How is it improper what? 
THE COURT: Rebuttal. 
MR. ESSMA: Because I'm not -- number one, they're hearsay. 
THE COURT: Well, they're probably being offered to show they're directly 
not true, rather than they are; right? 
MR. ESSMA: I don't know what the state wants them in for, but they're 
hearsay, number one, and I don't know what the exception to the hearsay 
rule is going to be. 
(Tr.2/16/11, p.1459, Ls.6-17 (emphasis added).) The Court overruled the 
hearsay objection finding that the evidence was admissible for non-hearsay 
impeachment purposes. (Tr. p.1469, Ls.5-9.) However, the district court later made it 
clear that it viewed the recordings, not merely as impeaching or for some not-for-the-
truth-of-the-matter-asserted-purpose, but as substantive evidence. The Court stated, 
You're being allowed to make a record. I just -- Here's the thing. I'll 
just be blunt: I've listened to them. I know what's on them. It's not a 
mere prior inconsistent statement. It is direct evidence that because 
of the late disclosure the state was not allowed to use in their case in 
chief. And I noted at the time of that ruling that the danger of the late 
disclosure is that there's a problem with witnesses getting up and saying 
whatever they want. 
In some cases this is an inconsistent statement with a 
particular thing they said on the phone, but it goes beyond that. And 
2 Counsel for Mr. Osterhoudt incorrectly cited to State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 
769 (1993), in support of this proposition in the Appellant's Brief. (See Appellant's Brief, 
p.38, f.n.15.) 
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it's obvious from the context of them it goes beyond that. So you have a 
right to object and to make a record, but the is offering it for more 
than that, that's clear, and listened them. 
I mean, how are they not just merely inconsistent statements? It's 
witnesses discussing -- obviously there's some inferences that can be 
drawn and perhaps argued one way or another -- but the clear gist of 
much beyond mere prior inconsistent statement 
(Tr. 2/16/11, p.1489, L.11 - p.1490, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
The court further held that the audio recordings were admissible as "some of the 
statements in these are prior inconsistent statements, or could be viewed that way," but 
that, 
What these tape-recorded conversations show is a pattern of 
witnesses planning testimony, conferring about it. Concoct may be a 
strong word, but that is an inference that can properly be drawn from the 
recordings. Getting their stories together, at best. 
Now there may be an alternate explanation for that, so the court in 
making this ruling does not need to find that fact exactly if the evidence 
has the tendency to show that, which is an obvious and reasonable 
inference from the context of these calls. 
So as to the relevance objection, some of the calls are brief, and 
perhaps if that were the only fragment would not appear to have much 
relevant information, but in light of the other phone calls they have obvious 
and extensive relevance. 
As to the question of impeachment, what we're dealing with here is 
not merely impeachment of a prior inconsistent statement. We're talking 
about bias, and I guess to put it uncharitably and maybe the most extreme 
inference again, fabrication or concocting of testimony. The witnesses 
testified to that. Their motive, their bias is all relevant. It is the most 
important issue in the trial. It is the most important function of the justice 
system, as the defense has argued when it came to the 404(b) evidence, 
to get at the truth. 
So bias is not collateral and bias is not something that is 
limited necessarily by the impeachment rule of prior inconsistent 
statements. And here by bias we have an effort where an inference can 
be drawn strongly from these recordings that there was an effort to 
coordinate testimony which was denied directly on the stand. 
(Tr.2/17/11, p.1493, L.4 - p.1495, L.13. (emphasis added).) 
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It is abundantly clear that the district court admitted these audio recordings for 
the truth of the matter asserted. The record reflects that Mr. Osterhoudt objected on 
hearsay grounds and the district court overruled his objection; therefore, his issue is 
preserved for appeal. Should this Court find that the district court erred in allowing the 
jury to consider these recordings as substantive evidence, the State bears the burden of 
demonstrating this error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Once again, the State failed to make any assertion that, should this Court agree 
with Mr. Osterhoudt and find that the district court did err in admitting the evidence, the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See generally, Respondent's Brief.) 
As such, should this Court find that the district court erred in admitting the recorded 
conversations between Mr. Osterhoudt and his niece, and Mr. Osterhoudt and his 
mother, this Court must vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court. 
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (holding that where alleged error is 
followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation 
occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also State v. Almaraz, 2013 
Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1, 2013) (petition for rehearing pending). 
IV. 
Even If Individually Harmless, The Accumulation Of Preserved Errors In This Case 
Deprived Mr. Osterhoudt A Fair Trial, Requiring This Court To Vacate His Convictions 
Finally, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that under the doctrine of cumulative error, that 
even if this Court finds the errors above to be individually cumulative, this Court should 
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nevertheless vacate his conviction. (Appellant's Brief, p.39.) In response, the State 
simply asserts that the district court did not error in the above rulings and that, therefore, 
the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. (Respondent's Brief, p.17.) Although 
Mr. Osterhoudt does not withdraw his cumulative error argument, due to the fact that 
the State has failed to claim that any error in any of the district court's rulings are 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, if this Court finds that the district court incorrectly 
ruled on any of the preserved claims of error, this Court must vacate his conviction. 
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (holding that where alleged error is 
followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation 
occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also State v. Almaraz, 2013 
Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1, 2013) (petition for rehearing pending). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Osterhoudt respectfully requests that this Court vacate all of his convictions 
and remand his case to the district court. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2013. 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 301h day of April, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
FRANKLIN WARD OSTERHOUDT 
INMATE #24465 
ICC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE ID 83707 
G RICHARD BEVAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
162 6TH AVE N 
PO BOX 126 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
JCP/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
11 
